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DENATURALIZATION BASED ON DISLOYALTY AND
DISBELIEF IN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
By D. E. BALCH*
F OUR months after war was declared, the Attorney General of
the United States announced the inauguration of a nation-wide
Denaturalization Program. It was undertaken as the result of
previous investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation and studies by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
which revealed that American citizenship had been granted to
sizeable numbers of former German and Italian nationals whose
adherence was still to National Socialism or Fascism and whose
loyalty was still to those regimes. The potential threat of such
persons to the internal security of the United States during the
early stages of the war was not known but, in the face of the elo-
quent effectiveness of the so-called Fifth Column in Europe, it
could not be discounted.
The Denaturalization Program was undertaken primarily as an
internal security measure to be used in conjunction with the Alien
Enemy Control procedure.lWith the divesting of citizenship of those
persons of German or Italian extraction who had manifested their
hostility to the United States, they became alien enemies and could
be interned and rendered impotent to interfere with our war prepa-
ration. However each individual case was separately reviewed and
passed upon by the Alien Enemy Control officials before intern-
ment was ordered, in spite of the fact that a federal district court
had already heard the evidence and had ordered naturalization
revoked.
From the inception of the denaturalization work in March,
'Mr. Balch is a member of the Minnesota Bar, and was formerly Special
Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States in charge of the
Denaturalization Program of the Department of Justice.
'Title 50 U.S.C. Sec. 21-24.
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1942, some 11,000 cases were examined of which almost ten thou-
sand were closed with a determination that the facts did not war-
rant action. On June 12, 1944, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in the Bamngartner Case2 which, with the earlier decision
of the Supreme Court in the Schneiderman Case,3 had the effect of
2Baumgartner v. United States, (1944) 322 U. S. 665, 64 S. Ct. 1240,
88 L. Ed. 1525. In this case all members of the court concurred, reversing
both courts below which has ordered citizenship revoked. Baumgartner was
a native of Germany, a German war veteran and officer and a highly educated
and intelligent person. He entered the United States in 1927 at the age of
32 and was naturalized five years later. The evidence introduced showed his
enthusiasim for the Hitler movement as early as 1927, when it was in its
very early stages, and the continuation of that feeling from 1932 to the time
of the trial. He expressed his preference for the German form of government,
his contempt for the United States and democracy repeatedly in public
speeches, in private conversations with friends and associates, and through-
out his diary which he maintained from December 1938 to June 1941. The
Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to show that Baum-
gartner had knowing reservations when he foreswore allegiance to Germany
in 1932 and that the evidence lacked the "solidity of proof which leaves no
troubling doubt in deciding a question." The court pointed out that the proof
of disloyalty was predominantly subsequent to naturalization rather than
contemporaneous with it. It also held that in cases involving non-fulfillment
of specific conditions such as residence, no problem is involved, whereas in
cases such as this one involving issues of belief or fraud, "weighty proof" is
required and even objective judgment is precarious. Pp. 670, 675, 677.
3The case of Schneiderman v. United States, (1943) 320 U. S. 118,
63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796, was handed down by the Supreme Court on
Jine 21, 1943. It involved an active leader of the communist party in
California who came to the United States from Russia when a small boy
and was naturalized in 1927. His communistic activity began at least five
years before his naturalization, continued to the date of the trial and in-
cluded such positions as educational director, executive secretary, organizer
and official spokesman, member of the communist party's national committee
and state secretary. He admitted that during all of the time of his member-
ship in the communist party, he subscribed to the principles of the organiza-
tion. The Supreme Court's decision, reversing both of the courts below which
had ordered Schneiderman's naturalization cancelled, as based upon the
ground that "the evidence was not clear, unequivocal, and convincing . . .
which does not leave the issue in doubt." This the court enunciated in the
Schneiderman case to be the burden of proof in such cases. The court also
held that the proof of the communist party doctrines were subject to two
possible interpretations, one reprehensible and the other not, and that it had
not been proved which of the two possible interpretations was accepted by
Schneiderman. The mijority opinions also raised two additional questions
and gave considerable attention to them without deciding them. (1) The
court emphasized the fact that an award of naturalization is a solemnjudgment and expressed doubt whether another court could subsequently
in a denaturalization proceeding, properly set it aside except upon evidence
of the type which traditionally vitiates judgments. (2) The court also
considered the question of whether attachment to the principles of the United
States Constitution was a subjective requirement for naturalization or
whether the statutory provisions could be met merely upon a findizg by the
naturalization court that the subject had behaved as a person so attached
irrespective of what his true sentiment might be. This case evoked a wide
divergence of opinion among the eight members of the court participating.
There were three separate opinions for the majority and a strong dissenting
opinion by the Chief Justice and two of the Associate Justices.
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rendering denaturalization based upon lack of allegiance or lack
of attachment to constitutional principles impossible in all but a
few of the pending cases. Accordingly June 12, 1944, marked the
virtual close of the Denaturalization Program. In all 543 com-
plaints had been filed in the various federal district courts, resulting
in the denaturalization of 165 persons and in the award of judg-
ment in favor of the defendants in 45 cases. An additional 81 had
been tried and were then under advisement or were pending upon
appeal, while 169 were awaiting trial and 83 had been withdrawn
by the government.
In relation to the wide scope of the program and the large num-
ber of cases which had been investigated, the number of actions
instituted was kept at a low figure in a careful effort to proceed
only in the most aggravated cases where denaturalization seemed
clearly warranted from the evidence and the threat presented to
the safety of the United States and its war operations.4 The greatest
care was exercised through the policies formulated by the Depart-
ment of justice to elevate the Denaturalization Program above the
influence of any possible war hysteria. It was undertaken only
after a careful survey of its need and its feasibility, begun a year
or more before the outbreak of war, and upon evidence developed
by investigation of the F.B.I. extending back several years.
Denaturalization is not a type of action necessarily confined to
periods of war. It is equally applicable and usable during peace-
time. Yet cancellation of naturalization based upon evidence of
disloyalty to the United States was first undertaken during the
periid tif World War I and was scarcely used again until the
,,utbreak of the present hostilities. This fact may lead to the con-
clusion that it is in reality a war measure used as a sanction or
punitive measure against those who support the enemy subsequent
'Among other things, determination regarding the cases in which suits
to cancel citizenship were to be instituted was governed by the principles
u.%preted by Judge Woolsey in United States v. Marini, (D. C. N. Y. 1936)
It F. Supp. 963, 965. The fraud or illegality charged must be "proved by the
clcarest and most satisfactory evidence, for it is obviously unfair that an
alien xl, has become a citizen should feel that his citizenship is an un-
stable status which can be easily destroyed by government proceedings
against him. irrespective of how long he may have lived here or of the ties
Of family or property by which he may have become bound."
,United States v. Wursterbarth, (D. C. N. J. 1918) 249 Fed. 908;
Unittd States v. Kramer. (C.C.A. 5th Cir., 1919) 262 Fed. 395; Schurmann,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir., 1920) 264 Fed. 917, appeal dismissed 257 U. S. 621;
United States v. Herberger, (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1921) 272 Fed. 278.
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to their naturalization.6 There is no principle more firmly fixed
or clearly recognized than that naturalization once legally obtained
is not subject to revocation. When naturalization has been legally
obtained, it may be forfeited for desertion in time of war, convic-
tion of treason or conviction of "attempting by force to overthrow
or by bearing arms against the United States."' 7 Nationality also
may be voluntarily relinquished by acts of expatriation." Both
forfeiture and expatriation however are wholly unrelated to de-
naturalization. Denaturalization is confined to those cases where the
individual was not qualified for naturalization at the time of its
procurement. The judgment revoking naturalization is a deter-
mination that the certificate of naturalization was void ab initio. It
might be considered an annulment.
THE STATUTE AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
The Denaturalization Program was undertaken with a recog-
nition that the legal theory had received but limited acceptance,
with a statute so general in its terms as to leave many questions in
doubt as to its meaning, and with a dearth of judicial precedents
and those sharply conflicting. The statute is no more definitive than
to provide that naturalization may be revoked in suits instituted
by the United States district attorney in the district of the de-
fendant's residence and in any court having the power to grant
naturalization, "on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such
order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured."'
Congress, having the exclusive right under the Constitution to
prescribe the qualifications for naturalization, has provided that
naturalization shall be granted in the manner prescribed by law
and not otherwise.10 The requirements for naturalization thus are
to be strictly construed, as the courts have repeatedly held, since
naturalization is a privilege and not a right. The Supreme Court
has stated that no alien has the slightest right to naturalization
unless all statutory requirements are met, and that every certificate
oSee United States v. Tedesco, (S. D. N. Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 322,
323; Turlej v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir., 1929) 31 F. (2d) 696.
699-700; Meyer v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir., 1944) 141 F. (2d)
825; Black, Disloyalty and Denaturalization, 29 Ky. L. J. 143, 160 (1941) ;
Note, Revocation of Certificates of Citizenship for Subsequent Acts of Dis-
loyalty, 44 Col. L. Rev. 80, 81.
7Title 8, U.S.C., See. 801 (g), (h).
sldem, Sec. 801.
9Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 738.
10Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 701(d) ; cf. Sec. 4 of Act of June 29, 1906, 34
Stat. 596.
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of naturalization must be treated as having been granted upon
the condition that the government may demand its concellation
unless issued in accordance with such requirements." If naturaliza-
tion is procured when the required qualifications have no existence
in fact, it is subject to cancellation.' 2
The cases leave no doubt of the strict construction the Supreme
Court has placed upon the requirements and qualifications for
naturalization. While recognizing that citizenship is a precious
privilege and its loss a grevious one, the courts have not hesitated
to cancel any certificate of naturalization procured without meet-
ing the procedural or fornal requirements prescribed by Congress.
Thus the Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of naturaliza-
tion where the defendant had not resided in the United States the
full five years prior to naturalization.'2 Naturalization was cancelled
where the subject, during the five-year statutory period subsequent
to naturalization, went to South Africa and established residence, 14
where the petition for naturalization was filed more than seven
"United States v. Ginsburg, (1917) 243 U. S. 472, 37 S. Ct. 422, 61 L.
Ed. 853; United States v. Ness, (1917) 245 U. S. 319, 38 S. Ct. 118, 62 L.
Ed. 321; Maney v. United States, (1928) 278 U. S. 17, 49 S. Ct. 15, 73 L.
Ed. 156; Tutun v. United States, (1926) 270 U. S. 568, 578, 46 S. Ct. 423,
70 L. Ed. 738. See also United States v. Schwimmer, (1929) 279 U. S. 644,
49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889; United States v. MLaclntosh, (1931) 283 U. S
605, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302; United States v. Bland, (1931) 283 U. S.
636, 51 S. Ct. 569, 75 L. Ed. 1319.
'!'The statutory requirements for naturalization can be briefly sum-
marizud as follows: First. Procedural requirements, such as the filing of a
certificate of arrival, declaration of intention to become a citizen, petition
for naturalization, affidavits of witnesses, preliminary and final hearings.
Second. Residence requirements, including lawful entry into the United
States for permanent residence, intention to reside permanently in the United
States, continuous residence within the United States for the statutory
period immediately preceding the date of the petition for naturalization (5
years in most instances). Third. Absence of any military disqualifications.
(8 U.S.C. 706; cf. R. S. Sec. 1996). Fourth. Literary requirements. (8
U.S.C. 704; cf. Sec. 8, Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596) ). Fifth. Racial
eligibility (8 U.S.C. 703; cf. R. S. Sec. 2169). Sixth. Good moral character.
(8 U.S.C. 707; cf. Sec. 4, Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596) ). Seventh.
Belief in organized government (8 U.S.C. 705, 732a; cf. Sec. 7, Act of
June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596) ). Eighth. Attachment to the principles of
the United States Constitution and willingness to support and defend it. (8
U.S.C. 707 (a), 732(a), 735(a) (b); cf. Sees. 4 & 27, Act of June 29,
1906 supra). Ninth. Renunciation of all foreign allegiance and the bearing
of true faith and allegiance to the United States (8 U.S.C. 735(a) (b) ; cf.
Sec. 4, Act of June 29, 1906 supra). For special provisions waiving certain
of the above requirements in the case of persons serving in the armed forces
of the United States, see 8 U.S.C.A. 723-725, 1001-1005. For special pro-
visions regarding alien enemies see 8 U.S.C. 726, 1003.
':Johannessen v. United States, (1912) 225 U. S. 227, 32 S. Ct. 613,
56 L. Ed. 1066.
'-Luria v. United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 9, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101.
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years after the filing of the declaration of intention, 1' where there
was a failure to file the certificate of arrival with the petition for
naturalization, 6 and in another case cancellation of naturalization
was affirmed where the certificate of arrival was not attached to
the petition for naturalization 'then the latter was filed in spite
of the fact that the certificate of arrival subsequently was filed and
accepted by the naturalization court.' Naturalization has been
cancelled where the subject had not known one of his witnesses
for the prescribed five years,' 8 and was cancelled even in a case
where the subject was in no way at fault himself and was wholly
ignorant of the fact that the court was departing from the pre-
scribed procedure in holding the naturalization hearing in chambers
instead of in open court.'
Allegiance and Attachment to Constitutional Principles
The disqualifications for naturalization involved in the above
described cases are all important, yet in no sense do they go to the
heart and to the essence of citizenship. If the naturalization require-
ments are to be so strictly construed and rigidly enforced in
regard to these procedural and regulatory requirements, how much
more important that the requirements of attachment to the United
States Constitution and allegiance to the United States, which
are the very essence of citizenship, be uncompromisingly insisted
upon. Acceptance of complete and undivided allegiance to the
United States and its institutions and willingness to defend this
country at all times without reservation, have been described by
the Supreme Court to be matters which are of the "essence of
statutory requirements for naturalization.""-
As stated by Chief Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion in the
Schneidernian case, "what could be more important in the selection
of citizens of the United States than that the prospective citizen be
attached to the principles of the Constitution."' - These things
go to the very heart of citizenship.
"United States v. Mforena, (1918) 245 U. S. 392, 38 S. Ct. 151, 62 L.
Ed. 359.
'
6United States v. Ness, supra, footnote 11.
17Maney v. United States, supra, footnote 11.
"sSchwinn v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 74,
aff'd (1940) 311 U.S. 616, 61 S.Ct. 70, 85 L.Ed. 390.
19United States v. Ginsberg, supra, footnote 11.
20United States v. MacIntosh, supra, footnote 11. See also Luria v.
United States, supra, footnote 14, and United States v. Schwimmer, supra,
footnote 11.
21320 U.S. 118, at p. 176.
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In the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy and in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Schneidermanr
case, rather strong doubt was expressed that any real and sub-
stantive attachment to constitutional principles is required under
the statute. Considerable credence was given to the theory that
the requirements of the statute were satisfied in this respect
merely upon a finding by the naturalization court that the subject
had behaved as one attached to constitutional principles irrespec-
tive of how antagonistic his subjective beliefs and personal feelings
might be.'-' In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Stone and
two concurring members of the Court, termed this an "emascula-
tion" of the statute."°
Previously the Supreme Court had held that under the 1906
Act the requirement of attachment created a test of belief and that
the subject must not only behave as one attached to constitutional
principles but in fact must be attached.2 4 It is believed when all of
the pertinent provisions of the 1906 Act are read together, even
without considering the subsequent amendments, which leave no
possible doubt of the Congressional intent, the conclusion be-
cfmes inevitable that Congress had no intention of admitting
persons to citizenship who were not in fact attached to constitu-
tional principles, as the earlier Supreme Court decision had held.
In expressing the view that the test of attachment to consti-
tutional principles may not be subjective beliefs and attitude, but
rather objective behavior and the finding of the naturalization
court regarding behavior, the majority in the Schneiderman case
stressed the provision of the 1906 statute which, in specifying the
requirements for naturalization prescribed in part, "It shall be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the court .... he has behaved
as a man . . . attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
2
'-'Idem, pp. 132-135, 162-165.
'-Idem, p. 175.
"United States v. MacIntosh, supra, footnote 11; United States v.
Schwimmer, supra, footnote 11; Luria v. United States, (1913) 231 U.S.
9. 22-23, 34 S.Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101. See also United States v. Tapolcsanyi,
(C.C.A. 3rd Cir., 1930) 40 F. (2d) 255; United States v. Morelli, (N.D.
Calif. 1943) 55 F. Supp. 181; In re Van Laaken, (N.D. Calif. 1938) 22 F.
Supp. 145. In the case of In re Saralieff, (E.D. 'Mo. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 436,
the Court said: "The expression 'well disposed' refers particularly to the
mental attitude of the applicant, with intent to exclude from citizenship
persons disbelieving in our form of government or hostile to it. Attached
to the principles of the Constitution means attachment to the principles of
free government as exemplified in that instrument. 'Attachment' 'is a strong-
er word than 'well disposed' and implies a depth of conviction which would
lead to an active support of the Constitution." (p. 436)
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United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
the same."25 Standing alone, this might properly be construed as
setting up an objective test rather than a subjective one, but it
must be read in conjunction with the balance of the section and
with the balance of the act. The same section continues, "In
addition to the oath of the applicant," the testimony of two
witnesses "to the facts" of attachment to the principles of the
Constitution and other matters shall be required. The Act further
sets out the form and provisions of the Petition for Naturalization
which is to be subscribed and verified under oath by the applicant.
The petition reads in part, " . . .I am attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States ....," The Act then
prescribed the contents of the oath to be taken before admission
to citizenship which required among other things a sworn declara-
tion, "that he ill support the Constitution and laws of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true
faith and allegiance to the same."' 27 Manifestly none of the latter
requirements of the 1906 Act could be satisfied unless the subject
was in fact attached to and subjectively believed in the principles
of the United States Constitution. Read collectively it is believed
that the various provisions of the Act compel the interpretation
that attachment to constitutional principles is a subjective
requirement as the earlier cases held.
Emphasizing the fact that the Congressional intent was in
accordance with the above interpretation, the basic act was
amended in 1929 by deleting the words "It shall be made to appear
to the satisfaction of the court admitting an alien to citizenship."28
The test is the possession of the necessary qualifications for
naturalization and not a finding by the court which may be contrary
to the true facts.2 9 Further emphasizing that attachment in fact
25320 U.S. 118, 132-133, 162. Sec. 4, Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596,
598. Note. Italics in this and subsequent quotations supplied.26Sec. 27, Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 604. Cf. Title 8, U.S.C.,
Sec. 732.2 Sec. 4, Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 597-8. Cf. Title 8, U.S.C.
Sec. 735.28Act of Mar. 2, 1929, c. 536, Sec. 6 b, 45 Stat. 1513.
29If the test were merely the objective one of behavior and a finding by
the naturalization court that the subject had behaved as a person attached
to the principles of the United States Constitution, then it follows that
naturalization would have been legally obtained and would not be subject
to revocation in the case of a person who admitted, subsequent to his nat-
uralization, that he came to the United States for the single purpose of
organizing peaceful opposition to constitutional government and desired the
security of American citizenship before making any overt act. The same
result would follow with respect to the allegiance requirements for natural-
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was required as contrasted with behavior, the provisions of the
1906 statute were again amended when the Nationality Act of
1940 was adopted. At that time the word "behaved" was eliminated
entirely, the requirement now reading that the subject "has been
and still is ... attached to the principles of the Constitution . . . "
The legislative history of this amendment points out that this was
not a change in substance but one of form only to clarify and
better express what had been the requirement of the statute all
along.31
While the Schneiderman decision did not actually hold that
attachment in fact is unnecessary for valid naturalization, it cast
such doubt upon this question, which previously had been con-
sidered settled law, as seemingly to weaken the rigidity of that
requirement and with it probably to question the unqualified
nature of the requirements pertaining to allegiance to the United
States. Thus since the Schneiderman decision, in one judicial
district twenty-two denaturalization cases were ordered dismissed,
the court holding that behavior is the test of attachment and also
holding that a case will not lie even where the oath of allegiance
is a false and perjured one since the decree awarding naturaliza-
tion was held to be res judicata against a subsequent denaturaliza-
tion suit predicated either upon lack of attachment to Constitu-
tional principles or lack of allegiance to the United States.3 2
Similarly the Circuit Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit has
recently held that .attachment to the principles of the Constitution
which the law exacts at naturalization is not addressed to the
heart; it demands no affection for, or even approval of, a demo-
cratic system of government" and that allegiance need not entail
any of the patriotism and affection such as is ordinarily associated
with it.Y'
ization, discussed infra, in the case of an individual whose sole purpose in
acquiring American citizenship was more effectively to work in the cause
of a foreign government. Naturalization obtained with admittedly fraudu-
lent intent would not be subject to cancellation in such instances.
:"'Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 707(a) ; Sec. 307(a), Nationality Act of 1940
(54 Stat. 1142).
3IReport Proposing a Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws
of the United States, prepared by the Sec. of State, Attorney General and
See. of Labor at the request of the President, June 13, 1938 at p. 23.
3*United States v. Kusche, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 201; United
States v. Korner, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 242; United States v.
Mayerhoffer, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 252; United States v. Mensing,
(S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 253; United States v. Siepp, (S.D. Calif.
1944) 56 F. Supp. 254; United States v. Specht, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 57 F.
Supp. 791. See also feyer v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1944) 141 F.
(2d) 825.
=
2United States v. Rossler, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 463.
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The statutory requirements that all foreign allegiance be re-
nounced and that true faith and allegiance in fact be accepted to
the United States would seem to be fully as categoric and un-
compromising as those respecting attachment.3 4 The statute is
not satisfied merely by the taking of an oath, but repeatedly
throughout the naturalization process declarations of intent and
purpose are required at each step. In his first papers or declara-
tion of intention, the applicant under oath must swear "that it is
bona fide his intention to . . . renounce forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty .... "'
Under oath in the petition for naturalization, he must swear that it
is his intention "to renounce absolutely and forever" all foreign
allegiance. 36 Finally in his oath in open court at the time of
naturalization, he must again swear that "he absolutely and en-
tirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign . . . state . . . that he will support and defend the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same.1137
The above provisions have remained substantially unchanged since
the 1906 Act was passed.
It is believed that these provisions indicate the Congressional
intent that absolute and entire allegiance and belief in constitu-
34"Allegiance" is a generic term, difficult of precise definition. As stated
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Bauingartner case, supra, footnote 2,
"Allegiance to this Government and its laws, is a compendious phrase to
describe those political and legal institutions that are the enduring features
of American political society. We are here dealing with a test expressing
a broad conception ... being nothing less than the bonds that tie Americans
together in devotion to a common fealty." See also Carlisle v. United
States, (1872) 16 Wall. 147, 154, 21 L.Ed. 426; United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, (1898) 169 U.S. 649, 659, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890. "It is funda-
mental that one can owe allegiance to a single country only . . . when one
swears allegiance to one country, he necessarily denies allegiance to another."
United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth, (W.D. N.Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp.
581, 583.35Sec. 4, Act of June 9, 1906, 34 Stat. 596. Cf. Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 735.
36Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 732; cf. Sec. 4, Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat.
596. In the case of United States v. Siegel, (D.Conn. 1945) 59 F. Supp.
183, the court recognized the subjective obligation of bona fide intention to
renounce foreign allegiance as sworn to in the petition for naturalization as
well as the actual renunciation of foreign allegiance in the oath at the time
of naturalization. Accordingly the defendant's certificate of naturalization
was ordered cancelled both on the ground that at the time of his petition for
naturalization he did not intend to forswear allegiance to the German Reich,
and that at the date of the taking of the oath he did not in fact renounce
allegiance to the German Reich or assume allegiance to the United States
without mental reservation.
37Sec. 4, Act of June 29, 1906. 34 Stat. 596, 597-8. Cf. Title 8, U.S.C.,
Sec. 735.
DENATURALIZATION PROGRAM
tional government are to be firm and uncompromising requirements
for valid naturalization. There is to be total abjuration of foreign
allegiance and real and personal attachment to the principles upon
which our constitution is based. Divided concepts and meaningless
oaths are not enough.s "American citizenship is a priceless pos-
session, and one who seeks it by naturalization must do so in
entire good faith, without any mental reservation whatever, and
with the complete intention of yielding his absolute loyalty and
allegiance to the countrr of his adoption. If he does not, he is
guilty of fraud in obtaining his certificate of citizenship." 39
judge Fee of the District of Oregon emphasized the obvious
when he stated that Congress provided in the procedure for ad-
mission to citizenship, not the repetition of the mere form of
words, but an essential change of mental attitude extending over
five years prior to the filing of the petition for admission. 40 As
the Supreme Court stated in one of the early leading cases it was
intended that a person "if admitted, should be a citizen in fact as
well as in name" and that his naturalization would be "mutually
beneficial to the Government and himself." Persons naturalized
were to assume and bear the obligations and duties of citizenship
as well as to enjoy its rights and privileges. All citizens owe their
allegiance to the government and it in turn owes them protection.
They are reciprocal obligations conditioned upon each other.41 This
does not mean that Congress intended that an alien, upon becoming
a citizen, should not retain memories and affection for his native
"United States v. Mickley, (E.D. Mich. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 735, 738;
United States v. Ackermann, (W.D. Tex. 1943) 55 F. Supp. 611, 616;
United States v. Fischer, (S.D. Fla. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 7, 8; United States
v. Schlotfeldt, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 935; United States v.
Holtz, (N.D. Calif. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 63; United States v. Jungerman,(N.D. Ind. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 727; United States v. Bregler, (E.D. N.Y.
1944) 55 F. Supp. 837; United States v. Haas, (N.D. N.Y. 1943) 57 F.
Supp. 910, 911; United States v. Herberger, (N.D. Wash. 1921) 272 Fed.
278, 291; United States v. Wezel, (S.D. Ill. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 16; United
States v. Ritzen, (D.C. Tex. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 301; United States v.
Baecker, (E.D. 'Mich. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 403; United States v. Bante, (S.D.
N.Y. 1943) 54 F. Supp. 728; United States v. Schuchhardt, (N.D. Ind.
1943) 49 F. Supp. 567; United States v. Ebell, (W.D. Tex. 1942) 44 F.
Suiip. 43.
zs'United States v. Kramer, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1919) 262 Fed. 395. As
the court recently stated in United States v. Ackermann, (W.D. Tex. 1943)
53 F. Supp. 611, 616, "There can be no divided allegiance. To become a
true citizen through naturalization, the applicant must 'absolutely and en-
tirely' renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to his native land.
There can be no reservation in any particular and to any extent."
'"United States v. Scheurer, (S. Ore. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 243. See also
United States v. Wurzenberger, (D. Conn. 1944) 56 F Supp. 381.
"Luria v. United States, (1913) 231 U.S. 9, 34 S.Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101.
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land. It merely means that the oath of allegiance to the United
States is to be full, complete and undivided with no reservations.
Res Adjudicata
From the time of the enactment of the basic 1906 statute, the
troublesome question has been present of the finality of a naturali-
zation decree and the findings of the naturalization court regarding
a subject's qualifications for naturalization: The 1906 Act provided
for the admission of aliens after a final hearing in which the ap-
plicant and his witnesses were "examined under oath before the
court." 2 Section 11 of the Act gave the government the right to
intervene in the naturalization proceedings and to be heard in
opposition to the petition for naturalization.4 3 Section 15 gave the
government the further power to institute suits to cancel certificates
of naturalization which had been illegally or fradulently obtained."
Thus the government is afforded two separate opportunities to
introduce evidence tending to show a subject's disqualification for
citizenship, and the decision in each instance is appealable.
That a naturalization decree is a judgment is clear .' Similarly,
there can be no doubt that Sections 11 and 15 of the 1906 Act were
intended to afford cumulative protection against fraudulent or
illegal procurement of naturalization or that Section 15 was in-
tended to afford a remedy broader than otherwise would have been
present in equity. 6 Any other interpretation would render Section
15 meaningless.
The finality of a naturalization decree has accordingly been
confusing, and is a problem which the Supreme Court has dealt
with several times in the past. As indicated above however, the
majority and concurring opinions in the Schneidernia) case re-
opened the questions decided in these earlier cases. In reconsidering
the question of whether the statutory prerequisite is attachment
in fact or merely a finding by the naturali-ation court that the
subject had behaved as a person attached to the principles of the
Constitution, the court was necessarily also reopening the
question of whether a naturalization decree is res adjudicata of the
question of attachment. The court went further however, and
-
2Sec. 9, 34 Stat. 596, 599; now Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 734(a).
4334 Stat. 596, 599; now Title 8, U.S.C., Sec. 734(d).
4434 Stat. 596, 601; now Title 8 U.S.C., Sec. 738(a).4 3Johannessen v. United States, szpra, footnote 13; Tutun v. United
States, supra, footnote 11.
46United States v. Ness, supra, footnote 11.47Supra, footnote 22.
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without deciding, expressed doubt whether a naturalization decree
can be set aside in any case, "aside from grounds such as lack of
jurisdiction or the kind of fraud which traditionally vitiates
judgments.' ' The effect has been to again throw open the question
of res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment, resulting in widely diver-
gent views among the lower courts.4 0 Some light can be thrown
upon the matter by reviewing the.development of previous judicial
precedents and the facts upon which they were based as well as
by examining pertinent parts of the naturalization process itself.
The constitutionality of Section 15 of the 1906 Act was first
before the Supreme Court in the Johannessen50 and Luri 51 cases
and was upheld in both. In'the Johannessen case, the defense of
estoppel by judgment was raised and was specifically rejected. The
decision recognized and cited previous cases to the effect that the
decision of a naturalization court is a judgment, as such is immune
from collateral attack, and is complete evidence of its own validity.
It held however that this fact did not preclude the constitutional
power of Congress to authorize direct attacks upon certificates
of naturalization in independent proceedings as under Section 1522
In the Johannessen case, the ground on which the cancellation suit
was based (lack of proper residence) had not been made an issue
in the naturalization court.
Subsequently in 1916 in the Ginsberg case, it was held that the
statutory requirements had not been met when the naturalization
proceedings were held in chambers rather than in open court. The
Supreme Court laid down the principle that a mistake of the
naturalization judge cannot supply inissing qualifications prescribed
for natmalization or render them non-essential. The decision con-
tinued that every certificate of naturalization is considered as having
been granted upon the condition that the government can challenge
it under Section 15 if it was not issued in accordance with the
statutory requirements.'-
In the Ness case which followed in 1917, the Supreme Court
had, before it the specific question of an issue which had been
11320 U.S. 118, 124. See also concurring opinions of Justices Douglas
and Rutledge.
"'Supra. footnote 32. Contra, United States v. Scheurer, (D. Ore. 1944)55 F. Supp. 243; United States v. Gallucci, (D.C. Mass. 1944) 54 F. Supp.
964; United States v. Holtz et al, (N.D. Calif. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 63, 66.
"'Supra. footnote 13.
:'1Supra. footnote 14.
;-225 U.S. 227, 236 et seq.
-rupra, footnote 11.
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raised and passed upon by the naturalization court being made the
ground of the subsequent suit to revoke naturalization.C4 Mr. Justice
Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, pointed out that
Section 15 is not only cumulative rather than alternative to Section
11, but that its application is broader in scope than the remedy
afforded independently in equity for setting aside judgments. The
opinion recognized and cited the leading cases which the Schneider-
man decision referred to as the basis for its doubt that a naturaliza-
tion decree can ordinarily be set aside in a subsequent suit to
revoke citizenship.5 3 The Ness case held that the relief afforded
under Section 15 however is narrower than the protection provided
under Section 11. The opinion pointed out that the purpose of the
Act would be defeated if in each instance the government had to
refrain from objecting to naturalization in order to protect its
subsequent right to enter suit for cancellation. Section 11 was in-
tended to minimize the number of suits necessary under Section
15. The opinion concluded that wherever fraud or illegality is
involved, a suit to cancel is in order.
The issues were next considered-by the Supreme Court in 1926
in the Tutun case."6 Mr. Justice Brandeis again spoke for the Court
on the question of whether a right of appeal exists from the decree
of a naturalization court. It was held that the naturalization court
exercises its judicial powers and that its decree is therefore an
appealable judgment. The case further pointed out that the scope
of a suit to cancel naturalikation is narrower than the review
afforded by direct appeal from the order granting naturalization.
This case was heavily relied upon by the Supreme Court in the
Schneiderman case in intimating that a naturalization decree is a
judgment which ought not be set aside except upon the type of
fraud which traditionally is ground for reopening judgments.
However it should be noted that the Tutun case involved merely
the narrow question of the right of appeal from a naturalization
decree, which right of appeal was held to exist because the nat-
uralization decree was an exercise of judicial power. That this case
was not intended to overrule the previous decisions cited above, is
clearly indicated by the tenor of the decision and the fact that it
cited those cases with approval, i. e. the Ness, Johannessen, Gins-
berg and Luria cases.
54Idem.
55United States v. Trockmorton, (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93;
Kibbe v. Benson, (1874) 17 Wall. 624, 21 L. Ed. 741.56Tutun v. United States, (1926) 270 U.S. 568, 46 S.Ct. 423, 70 L. Ed.
738.
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The applicability of the doctrine of res adjudicata in the
instance of naturalization decrees was again before the Supreme
Court in the Manev case in 1928. 7 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, clarified the Ttun decision by pointing
out that, while a naturalization decree is a judgment, it differs
from other judgments in that it does not determine an existing
right but grants one which did not previously exist. The case held
that the special nature of the judgment was sufficient reason for
rejecting the defense of res adjudicata against the statutory pro-
vision to cancel naturalization fraudulently or illegally acquired.
It concluded, however, following the rationale in the earlier cases,
that this was not special treatment since the absence of a qualifica-
tion prerequisite for naturalization precluded its valid award.
Otherwise, the decision pointed out, the naturalization court would
be permitted to enlarge its own jurisdiction against the sovereign
that granted and defined its jurisdiction by making findings that
qualifications for naturalization existed, which Congress had made
prerequisite, when in fact they were lacking. The principles and
reasoning enunciated in this and other cases discussed above have
been followed in the lower courts.5
The nature and construction of a naturalization decree are
further revealed by a careful examination of the history and de-
velopment of the denaturalization process and the purpose of each
amendment of the statutes. Prior to 1906 there had been wholesale
frauds and irregularities in obtaining naturalization. 9 It was to
571Maney v. United States, (1928) 278 U.S. 17, 49 S.Ct. 15, 73 L. Ed.
156.
",United States v. Milder, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 571; United
States v. Parisi, (D.C. Md. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 414, 418; United States v.
Ovens, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 376; United States v. Ali, (E.D.
Mich. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 998. See also Moore, Digest of International Law,
Vol. 3, See. 422 to the effect, "the principle of res judicata appears to be
theoretically inapplicable to a decree of naturalization, which is in no wise
a judgment terminating a pre-existing controversy, but which is, on the
contrary, the basis of constant and repeated future claims on the part of the
beneficiary to the rights and privileges of citizenship and the protective
action of the government."
,'Report of House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
(H.Rep. No. 1789, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2). "With the great influx of
foreigners who have in recent years come to our shores and who are yearly
coming in increasing numbers, and who seek naturalization under our laws,
a very loose, unsatisfactory, and careless method of naturalization has
grown up, leading to the grossest character of frauds against American
citizenship. The conditions that have been revealed by special investigations
of frauds committed against the naturalization laws render wholly unneces-
sary any argument upon the necessity at this time of fully exercising all the
authority in naturalization matters conferred by the Cobstitution upon
Congress.... The worst and most glaring frauds have consisted in perjury,
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correct such abuses and to prevent their recurrence that the Act of
June 29, 1906 was passed. It was the first general overhauling of
the naturalization laws for many years and it provided for the
first time the right to cancel or revoke naturalization fraudulently
or illegally procured.60 Uniform naturalization procedures were
set up in the Act and the Bureau of Naturalization was created to
supervise naturalization on a national basis.
As indicated above, the Act provided that at the final hearing
the applicant and witnesses were to be examined under oath before
the court. 1 In the succeeding years it became apparent that the
courts did not have the facilities nor the time to investigate the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization and that even the
brief inquiry which took place in open court pursuant to the statute
was causing a great deal of congestion. The Secretary of Labor
and the Commissioner of Naturalization for many years recom-
mended legislation "to relieve the courts in the large cities from
the disorderly congestion of the unnecessary number of witnesses
with the applicants at naturalization hearings,""- and in 1926 a
group of federal judges appeared before the House Committee on
Immigration and testified that the district courts did not have the
necessary facilities for determining the facts as to each of the
many applicants for citizenship. 3 At this same time a letter was
written by Chief Justice Taft, dated May 25, 1926 to the Chairman
of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, in
false impersonation, and the sale and use of false and counterfeit certificates
of naturalization .... In order to correct the abuses that have been disclosed
it is imperative, in the judgment of this committee, that a law should be
enacted prescribing a fixed and uniform system and a code of procedure in
naturalization matters."
OSupra, footnote 44. Representative Goulden, one of the sponsors of
the legislation, during the debates stated, "If any alien shall impose upon
the court by perjured testimony, or if a certificate has been issued in viola-
tion of the law, the bill makes the certificate invalid and authorizes proceed-
ings in any court of competent jurisdiction to cancel certificate of citizen-
ship .... A certificate tainted with fraud is in the sense of the law no cer-
tificate at all." (40 Cong. Rec. 7040).
61Supra, footnote 42.
62H. Rep. No. 1328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. The committee report also
showed, "The naturalization examiners have for many years conducted ad-
ministrative examinations of the applicants and their witnesses and reported
the results to the courts. In almost all instances the favorable reports of the
examiners are accepted by the courts."
63These included Judges Learned Hand, Augustus N. Hand, George
W. Anderson and Edward J. Henning. Judge Augustus Hand, now a mem-
ber of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit testified, "I do
not think it (the preliminary naturalization proceeding) is judicial work at
all; I would like to see it treated as purely administrative work, with a
review as to questions of law in the court." (House Committee Hearings,
Vol. 427, Pt. 4, p. 7.) Infra, footnote 75.
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which he expressed his belief that the granting of naturalization
should be entirely removed from the courts and handled by nat-
uralization examiners as a purely administrative function. "
In recognition of the problem, Congress amended Section 4 of
the Act of June 29, 1906, setting up an entirely new procedure
for naturalization. ' Under the new amendment, the courts were
authorized to permit the entire inquiry into the qualifications of
applicants for citizenship to be conducted by designated naturaliza-
tion examiners, and where this procedure was utilized, the ex-
amination of the applicant and his witnesses "before the court and
in the presence of the court" as previously required, was waived.
The naturalization court was merely required to administer the
oath.' " This was Congressional recognition that the courts did not
have adequate facilities to determine the eligibility of each appli-
cant for naturalization and the need for an administrative organiza-
tion t- ascertain the facts. It is interesting to note that this amend-
ment was enacted only about two months after the Supreme Court
on April 12, 1926 in the Tutun case, supra, had held a naturaliza-
tion decree to be an appealable judgment, and accordingly it should
be recognized that the Tutun decision, so heavily relied upon in
the Schnciderman case, was based upon the old procedure prior to
the 1926 amendment.
In 1929 Congress again expressed the intent inherent in the
1926 amendment, and further manifested its recognition of the
*lThe letter read: "I have examined Senate bill 4251 as it has been
submitted to the House, and I sincerely hope that it will pass, because I
think it will very much shorten the time which the Federal district judges have
had to take in the matter of naturalization. I could have wished that the neces-
sity for administering the oath by a Federal judge might also have been
dispensed with, because in great centers where there are many applicants
for naturalization there is much interference with the regular business of
the court in criminal and civil matters by the presence in the corridors and
in the court rooms of the applicants for naturalization, their witnesses, and
their families. The time of one district judge in some districts for 2 or 3
days in the week is consumed with the hearings of naturalization cases. It
can be just as well done by the examiners selected by the senior districtjudge, as provided in this bill, and the hanging about the court rooms and
the court corridors of the applicants and the witnesses can be very largely
avoided by requiring them to attend upon the examiners at a different place.
If there are to be but few personal examinations by the judges, as this act
indicates, the matter of administering of the oaths of allegiance to those
who are admitted can be disposed of in very much less time than under the
prescnt system. I earnestly hope that the bill will pass." (H. Rep. 1328, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.)6"--Act of June 8, 1926, c. 502, 44 Stat. 709. See Title 8 U.S.C. Sec. 733,
734.
";"The procedure under the new act is summarized in the Report Pro-
posing a Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United
States, supra, footnote 31, pp. 45-46.
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difficulty of definitely ascertaining in advance of naturalization all
facts bearing upon the eligibility of the applicant for citizenship.
The statute as amended deleted the words "it shall be made to ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizen-
ship" which phrase had previously been a prefix to the enumerated
qualifications for naturalization.67 The amendment substituted the
words "No alien shall be admitted to citizenship unless" possessed
of the prescribed qualifications. The 1929 amendment would clearly
seem to evidence the Congressional intent that a decree of naturali-
zation was not to be considered as an inviolable finding of eligibility
and qualification for citizenship, but rather that the validity of
naturalization is to be entirely dependent upon the actual possession
in fact of the prerequisites laid down by Congress."'
At the present time the naturalization court usually does not
pass on the facts at all. The Report of the President's Committee
regarding the Naturalization Laws6" shows that from 1927 to 1934
inclusive, in over three quarters of a million cases, the recom-
mendations of the designated naturalization examiners were ap-
proved without any examination by the court in 98.89 per cent of
the cases. Thus the nature of the inquiry and the extent of the
investigation conducted by the naturalization examiners becomes
pertinent. The report 'of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service for the year 1943, Table 21, shows that in the years from
1930 through 1940 there were from 113,000 to over 235,000 persons
who were naturalized annually,70 and in these same years the
number of naturalization examiners ranged from 92 to 142. Not all
of these men spend full time on this work. Those assigned to ex-
amine into the qualifications of prospective citizens have an average
daily assignment per man to interview 17 applicants and their
witnesses. This constitutes an average of 51 interviews daily and
enables the examiner to spend less than one-half hour on the
average case. No further investigation is ordinarily conducted.
During the short time available for each case, the applicant
and his witnesses are interrogated concerning the competency and
credibility of witnesses, immigration status, residence, validity of
07Act of March 2, 1929, c. 536, Sec. 6b., 45 Stat. 1513, see Title 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 707 (a).
-For a very able review of the history and changes in the law and the
procedure used in naturalization cases, see United States v. Scheurer, (D.
Ore. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 243.
69Supra, footnote 31.
70Included in the Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United
States, 1943.
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the declaration of intention, moral character, arrest record, marital
status, obedience to law, educational qualifications, attachment to
the principles of the Constitution, etc.7 1 It is apparent that these
subjects can not be fully explored in the time available or in fact
without the opportunity for actual investigation and verification of
the information received.
The above makes it apparent that in the ordinary case, naturali-
zation is granted without either the court or the Immigration and
Naturalization Service having an opportunity fully to explore the
qualifications of the applicant for citizenship nor to make more than
the most cursory inquiry. It further indicates a Congressional rec-
ognition that to investigate each prospective citizen prior to nat-
uralization was impossible for the courts and was administratively
unfeasible for the Immigration and Naturalization Service because it
would require setting up a huge investigative staff and sizeable appro-
priations. The alternative employed has been to facilitate naturaliza-
tion with minimum delay and expense, retaining the right to revoke
naturalization in those relatively few instances where it is subse-
quently established that citizenship was fraudulently or illegally ob-
tained by persons in fact not eligible. The Congressional intent
seems to have been as stated in the Ginsberg case, "every certificate
of citizenship must be treated as granted upon the condition that the
Government may challenge it . . .and demand its cancellation un-
less issued in accordance with such requirements.
-7 2
If a naturalization decree is to be considered as a judgment of
the ordinary type, as discussed in the Schlzneiderman.case and as
held in the Kusche case, 7' and which can be set aside only upon
the grounds which traditionally vitiate judgments, or even if a
burden of proof is to be required which can be met in relatively
few instances, the result in practice is to award naturalization
without more than a cursory check into the applicant's eligibility
and with practically no recourse later if the subject is subsequently
71With regard to allegiance, there is little to investigate prior to natur-
alization. Allegiance is not actually owing to the United States until the
oath of allegiance and renunciation is taken at the time naturalization is
conferred. Accordingly the truth or falsity of the oath of allegiance cannot
be ascertained until after it has been taken, or after naturalization has been
obtained.
7*United States v. Ginsberg, (1917) 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422, 61 L.
Ed. 853.
7JSchneiderman v. United States, (1943) 320 U. S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333,
87 L. Ed. 1796; United States v. Kusche, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp.
201.
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found to have been lacking in certain of the prescribed qualifica-
tions. From the above it is believed that the observation can prop-
erly be made that a naturalization decree is a judgment and a
judicial function merely because of the procedure set up for
granting it,7 and therein lies the basic legal problem. By nature, it
is believed to be an administrative function and would be con-
sidered as such if not assigned to the courts.75
Burden of Proof
It is readily apparent that denaturalization cases predicated
upon lack of allegiance or lack of attachment to constitutional
principles, must be given the most careful analysis by the courts
and must provide the defendants with every possible safeguard.
This is so not only because loss of citizenship is extremely serious
in its consequences, but also because the evidence will involve
political beliefs and will be closely related to freedom of thought
and freedom of expression.70 The Schneidernian decision for the
first time enunciated the burden of proof in denaturalization cases
as requiring "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which
74Cf. Tutun v. United States, (1926) 270 U. S. 568, 46 S. Ct. 423, 70
L. Ed. 738.
75In discussing the bill which became the Act of June 29, 1906, the
Congressional debates reveal the following statement by Mr. Bonynge:
" ... The fact is that the United States and Canada, so far as I know, are
the only countries in the world that use the courts at all for the naturalization
of aliens. It is really an executive and not a judicial proceeding. In all other
countries it is done through the department of state, and probably would
have been in this country had it not been for the fact that our Department
of State has "no machinery scattered all over the country, and for the lack
of machinery the original statute in regard to naturalization conferred this
power upon the courts. It partakes somewhat of a judicial proceeding it is
true, and the courts have held that a decree admitting an alien to naturaliza-
tion has the force and effect of a judgment. But in its essence the proceeding
is really not judicial; it is executive." (59th Cong. 1st Sess., May 17, 1906,
40 Cong. Rec. 7057). Cf. supra, footnotes 63, 64.
7GIt has been contended by some that a denaturalization suit of this
type is violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech. On the
contrary, no attempt is made to curb the defendant's freedom of thought
or expression nor to punish him for his political views or attachments to
Germany. The proceeding is equitable in nature and not penal, Luria v.
United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 9, 27, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101. It is
merely to test the validity of naturalization including allegiance to the
United States and attachment to the principles of the constitution. Since
these matters obviously enter the field of political thought, the question
immediately narrows down to the Congressional power to define political
beliefs and political allegiance as tests of the right of naturalization and
cancellation of naturalization. This right can scarcely be doubted. Cf. Turner
v. Williams, (1904) 194 U. S. 279, 24 S. Ct. 719, 48 L. Ed. 979; Lopez v.
Howe, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 401, appeal dismissed and certiorari
denied, (1920) 254 U. S. 613, 650, 41 S. Ct. 63, 65 L. Ed. 438.
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does not leave the issue in doubt. ' 77 Subsequently in the Baum-
gartncr case, the majority opinion described the evidence as lack-
ing the "solidity of proof which leaves no troubling doubt. '7 8 In
these two cases the Supreme Court has laid down a burden of proof
which is difficult indeed to meet in cases involving such intangible
and indefinite matters as allegiance and attachment to constitutional
principles, on which concepts men's minds differ very greatly.79
In the facts which must be proved in order to revoke naturali-
zation, the Baunigartner case also stressed the fact that the
gravamen of that case was a "consciously withheld allegiance to
the United States and its Constitution and laws" and that to
prove "such intentional misrepresentation" the evidence pertained
only to "objective falsity" as contrasted with "perjurious falsity"
of the oath of allegiance and renunciation. While the dicta in the
body of the opinion purported not to pass upon the question of
whether "purjurious falsity" as contrasted with "objective falsity"
of the oath is required for denaturalization, the concluding para-
graph of the opinion indicates that the holding was predicated at.
least in part upon the fact that there was insufficient proof of
"knowing reservations" in the oath of allegiance.8" The complaint
in the Baum gartner case alleged both fraud and illegality to be
present in the defendant's false oath of allegiance and in his lack
of attachment to constitutional principles.8 ' This case accordingly
presents the sharply defined question of whether there need be the
element of intent or perjury to constitute a false oath of allegiance.
"Fraud connotes perjury, concealment, falsification, misrepre-
sentation or the like. But a certificate is illegally, as distinguished
77For a discussion of the validity of this burden of proof see comment
of Chief Justice Stone, 320 U. S. 118, 178. See also The Schneiderman
Casc-Some Legal Aspects, W""alter B. Kennedy, Acting Dean, Fordham
Univ. School of Law, 12 Fordham L. R. 231 (Nov. 43).7xBaumgartner v. United States, (1944) 322 U. S. 665, 64 S. Ct. 1240,
88 L. Ed. 1525.
,This is illustrated in the Baumngartner and Schnciderman cases, in
both of which the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the trial courts on
the weight and interpretation which they had placed upon the evidence, as
well as also reversing the concurring opinions of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in each case. See also Meyer v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1944) 141 F. (2d) 825. Denaturalization involves largely questions of fact
in which the credibility of the witnesses, particularly the defendant, and the
weight to be given the conflicting testimony is all important. The cases are
tried without a jury and the trial judge is the trier of the facts, whose
findings are presumed to be correct, and if there is evidence to support them
and they are not clearly erroneous, they are not to be disturbed. Rule 52,
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. foll. 723c.S01322 U. S. 665, 671-2, 677.
61Ibid. p. 678.
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from fraudulently, procured when it is obtained without compliance
with a 'condition precedent to the authority of the Court to grant
a petition for naturalization.' Maney v. United States, 278 U. S.
17, 22. '" The difference between illegality and fraud in denaturali-
zation cases is intent or wilfulness. Knowing and intentional
illegality thus becomes fraud. Facts that would otherwise constitute
fraud, but from which wilfulness or intention to falsify are absent,
constitute illegality.8 3
We have discussed above the fact that the oath of allegiance
requires the divesting of foreign allegiance in fact and the ac-
ceptance of allegiance to the' United States in its stead. It is a
condition piecedent to valid naturalization. If the oath is taken
with a conscious mental reservation or a conscious intent to retain
foreign allegiance and not to accept full allegiance to the United
States, fraud is obviously present. If the element of willfulness or
conscious falsification is lacking, but no actual divesting of foreign
allegiance is made and no complete transfer of allegiance to the
United States is in fact made, naturalization is nevertheless
illegally obtained because a "condition precedent" to valid naturali-
zation has not been met.84 It is believed that the conclusion must
follow that intent or perjury is not a necessary element in a de-
82Schneiderman v. United States, (1943) 320 U. S. 118, 161-2, 63 S.
Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796.
83"As it was clear to the learned trial judge, who saw and heard
the witnesses, and is equally clear to us that he was not attached to its
principles at the time he applied for naturalization, the respondent did not
meet that condition. Therefore as his statement in his petition to the contrary,
however honestly made in view of his peculiar notions, amounted in law to a
false representation, the order admitting him to citizenship must stand
vacated and his certificate of citizenship remain cancelled." United States
v. Tapolcsanyi, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 255, 257-8.84The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Baungartner case expressed this
principle very well: " . . . The great importance of the proceeding to the
United States and the fact that only the alien can know what his real
allegiance to this country is, compel the conclusion that, if the alien mis-
takenly swears to an allegiance which he does not possess or which perhaps,
for reasons overlooked by or unknown to him at the time of his naturaliza-
tion, he can never possess, he has failed to satisfy this requirement for his
admission to citizenship. It is the fact of the alien's allegiance to this
country at the moment of naturalization and not his belief concerning it
upon which the right to naturalization depends." Baumgartner v. United
States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 29, 34. Several other cases
have held similarly although variously describing the false oath of allegiance
as "legal fraud"; United States v. Herberger, (W.D. Wash. 1921) 272 Fed.
278, 291; United States v. Mickley, (E.D. Mich. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 735,
738; as "constructive or implied fraud"; United States v. Fischer, (S.D.
Fla. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 7, 8; or as "latent reservation"; United States v.
Haas, (N.D. N.Y. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 910, 911. See also United States v.
Wurzenberger, (D. Conn. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 381.
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naturalization case based upon false oath of allegiance or upon
lack of attachment to constitutional principles85
If it were necessary to prove, in each case based upon false oath
of allegiance, that there was a willful falsification, virtually all of
the elements essential to establish a criminal violation would also
have to be met in order to revoke naturalization. Criminal penalties
have been provided in the case of any person who "knowingly
procures naturalization in violation of the provisions of this Act"
or in other words who knowingly procures naturalization without
meeting the statutory requirements."6 Conviction under the 1906
Act further required that the certificate of naturalization be. ad-
judged void, thus revoking naturalization as well as imposing
criminal penalties for willful falsifications. For denaturalization
cases, the burden of proof laid down by the Supreme Court is
-clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which does not leave
the issue in doubt." This would seem to be no less stringent than
the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt" as required in
criminal cases. If willfulness and intent were necessary to de-
naturalize for false oath of allegiance, the effect thus would be
much the same as requiring that a criminal offense be proved in
each case.
Consolidation of Cases
More than 145 of the denaturalization cases which were brought
to trial involved members of the German American Bund. Upon
a showing that these persons had full knowledge and were in full
accord with the aims and objectives of the Bund, it became an
important part of their cases to prove the disloyal character of
the organization and the fact that its doctrines and program were
repungnant to and incompatible with allegiance to the United
States and with attachment to constitutional principles.
Under the statute, the venue in each denaturalization case is
the judicial district in which the defendant resides at the time of
bringing suit.87 Defendants who were Bund members lived in no
-z"In other words, if the applicant retains his old allegiance at the time
of his declaration, of his petition, and at the time of his oath, does that
state of mind, in itself, constitute fraud, or does it constitute a failure to
fulfill a requirement of the Act which makes the naturalization illegal be-
cause the naturalization of a person who did not, in fact, fulfill the conditions
upon which the decree could have been granted legally? I believe that it does
both." United States v. ,Vurzenberger, (D. Conn. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 381.
,.3Sec. 23, Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 603. See Title 8, U. S. C.,
Sec. 746.
S7Title 8 U. S. C. Sec. 738(a).
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less than 18 separate judicial districts. Each denaturalization suit
is an individual case against a single defendant and there is no way
of filing one complaint against a group of several defendants, no
matter how similar the proof might be establishing their fraudulent
'or illegal procurement of citizenship.
The voluminous nature of the evidence necessary to describe
each phase of the Bund and to demonstrate its true significance
made it physically and financially impracticable, if not impossible,
to present it 145 times or more.sS To overcome this difficulty, the
consolidation procedure provided for under Rule 42, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, was utilized wherein cases may be consolidated
for trial for the purpose of hearing evidence on questions of law
or fact common to all. 9 Under this procedure, separate complaints
were filed against the persons whose denaturalization was sought.
in the various districts where they resided. In each district where
there were defendants who had been members of the German
American Bund and proof of the disloyal character of the organi-
zation was one of the elements to be proved, a petition was filed
with the court prior to trial, requesting that the cases be ordered
consolidated for the single purpose of introducing evidence regard-
ing the Bund and that thereafter they be severed, with the balance
of each case being tried separately. Almost without exception, the
Courts granted such petitions. 9° In the Southern District of Cali-
fornia, consolidation of this type was agreed to by most of the
defendants.91 This limited consolidation had the advantage to the
government and to the defendants, as well as to the courts, of saving
a great deal of time and reducing the trial expenses by making
it necessary to introduce the evidence regarding the Bund only
once for the entire group of cases. At the same time, the separate
8$792 Exhibits and 381 witnesses were used in the case of United States
v. Kusche et al, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 201.
89"CONSOLIDATION. When actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing
or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Rule 42(a), Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. foll. 723c.
9oUnited States v. Bregler et al, (E.D. N.Y. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 837;
United States v. Sautter et al, (N.D. Ill. 1943) 54 F. Supp. 22; United
States v. Holtz et al, (N.D. Calif. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 63; United States v.
Baecker et al, (E.D. Mich. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 403; United States v. Haas
et al, (N.D. N.Y. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 910; United States v. Kuhn et al, (S.D.
N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 407; United States v. Knauer, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.,
May 1945).
91United States v. Kusche et al, (S.D. Calif. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 201.
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identity of each case was preserved and the evidence pertaining to
each defendant's personal activities was heard separately.
Using the above procedure, the cases ordinarily began with the
government introducing evidence to prove the aims and program
of the German American Bund as a national organization and also
evidence describing the activities of the local unit, in which the
particular defendants were active. Each of the defendants had the
right of separate cross examination of the government's witnesses
and the separate right to object to the introduction of evidence. The
right of introducing rebuttal testimony at that time was also
present, although little effort was made to disprove the rather over-
whelming evidence of the Bund's un-American activities.
When this evidence pertaining to the nature of the organization
had been concluded, the trial of the cases was severed and separate
trial dates were set for the remaining portion of each case. In the
separate hearings, evidence was offered of the defendant's member-
ship and activities in the Bund, proof to show his knowledge of
and agreement with its doctrines and program, and other proof
to establish his fraudulent or illegal procurement of naturalization.
If the Court found that the proof was sufficient to charge the de-
fendant with having knowledge of and being in accord with the
Bund's National Socialist objectives, the evidence relating to the
organization became a part of the case against him. Otherwise it
was disregarded in so far as his case was concerned. Upon the
evidence found to be admissible and applicable to each separate
defendant, the Court then made individual findings of fact and
issued separate judgments in each case.
For use in trying these cases in the various judicial districts, a
trial brief of the oral and documentary evidence was prepared in
the Department of Justice in Washington and mimeographed
copies were made for all of the United States Attorneys or other
trial attorneys who were to present the cases. This trial brief,
digesting the testimony of witnesses and containing excerpts from
the exhibits, comprised almost 1,000 pages and from one week to
several weeks were consumed in introducing this evidence, depend-
ing upon the number of defendants involved and the amount of
cross examination and the number of objections to the admission
of evidence.
Further to facilitate the preparation and trial of the cases,
attorneys who had spent months in studying all of the written
documents, interrogating the witnesses at great length and assist-
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ing in organizing the evidence and writing the trial brief, were
successively assigned from one judicial district to the next where
cases were to be tried, in order to aid in their preparation and pre-
sentation.
Since several of the same witnesses were used in all of the
trials, it became necessary to formulate an itinery for them and
frequently to arrange for them to travel from one trial to the next
on successive days. For a time these witnesses virtually had to give
up their businesses because testifying as government witnesses
was occupying most of their time., Use of the same documentary
exhibits at the numerous trials also posed a problem. Several of
them were voluminous instruments from 50 to 100 pages in length
and of which there was but one original copy. Most of them were
in the German language and had to be translated. In order to
make their use possible, a large number of photostatic copies of
each exhibit with its translation were prepared, and the photo-
static copies of the exhibits were made up into sets and sent to
the several districts where trials were to be held. In pre-trial
conferences provided for under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the defendants were asked to agree that the
photostatic copies of the exhibits would be as equally admissible as
the originals. Had this concession been refused in any case,
the originals were available for trial purposes. At the pre-trial
conferences exhibits and translations were made available to the
defendants and their attorneys and for an agreed period of time
prior to trial they were also made available for inspection and
study.
The above procedure in substantially the same form was used
in some 1'4 separate judicial districts from Connecticut to Los
Angeles, in at least two of which the evidence was twice introduced.
It is believed that this organization and preparation of evidence
in such a way that it could be introduced in one judicial district
after another by different trial attorneys each time, was somewhat
unique in trial procedure.
The German American Bund
National Socialism
A significant accomplishment of the Denaturalization Program
was that the trials, and the press and radio accounts of the evi-
dence introduced by the government, served to acquaint many
people with the tangible facts regarding the German American
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Bund. Whereas persons frequently had only hazy and inaccurate
impressions of the Bund, the concrete evidence presented in court
in the various cities, provided a first hand tangible picture of the
organization and its efforts to promote the doctrines of National
Socialism in the United States. Among the former leaders of the
Bund who testified as government witnesses were Peter Gissibl,
one of the original founders; Severin Winterscheidt, national press
officer and editor of the Bund newspaper; Willy Luedtke, national
secretary; and John C. Metcalfe, newspaper correspondent who
joined the Bund to investigate it and who became acquainted with
most of the Bund officials and who toured the country visiting the
various units. Corroborating these witnesses was the testimony of
members or former members of the various local units and official
Bund documents. Among the exhibits introduced were such basic
documents as the "Bundesbefehle" or 50 "Bund Commands" issued
by the "Fuehrer" (The Bund's National Leader) to the local units;
the Structural Orders or regulations for the various branches of
the Bund such as the "Ordnungs Dienst" (Order Division or
Storm Troops), "Die Jugendschaft" (Youth Group), etc.; the
official Bund yearbooks; convention minutes; membership books;
song books and the official Bund newspapers recording its activities
and objectives.
This evidence, put together piece by piece, traced the history
of the Bund from its organization in Chicago in 1924 until its
formal disbanding after war was declared in 1941, at which time
its activities and objectives were to be continued by its members
forming singing societies, athletic groups, etc.
The organizers of the Bund were a small group of N.S.D.A.P.
or Nazi party members who had come to the United States from
Germany and who had settled in the Chicago area. The first or-
ganization was called the "Free Society of Teutonia" and its
leader was Fritz Gissibl who had taken part in the unsuccessful
Munich Beer Hall Putsch the previous November 9th. In 1926 the
name of the group was changed to the "National Socialist Society
of Teutonia." This change in name reflected the grogress of Hitler's
National Socialist movement in Germany as did also the further
change in 1932 to "Friends of the Hitler Movement." Hitler having
achieved power in Germany in January, 1933, the name of the
organization in the United States was changed that same year to
"'Friends of the New Germany." In 1936 the name was changed
to "Amerikadeutscher Volksbund" (German-American Bund).
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During this entire period of time, the objectives of the organization
remained the same except that originally the purpose was to aid in
Hitler's rise to power. After Hitler became head of the German
state, the aim became one of extending the precepts of National
Socialism to the entire German-American element in this country.
During the early years of the Bund, the members were also
members of the Nazi Party. By 1933 however the N.S.D.A.P. local
units in the United States were disbanded and absorbed into the
Friends of the New Germany, and Nazi party dues were paid
through that organization. In fact until Hitler came to power, the
Bund had a program of annually sending to him the equivalent of
one week's earnings of each member of the group.
The structural organization of the Bund in the United States
was identical with the parent organization in Germany. At its
head was the Fuehrer or national leader. The United States was
divided into three districts or "Gaus" over each of which was a
"Gauleiter." Under the "Gaus" were the local units or "Ortes-
gruppe" headed by "Ortsgruppen Leiters." As in Germany, there
were the "Jugendschaft" and "Maedchenschaft" or boys and girls
groups which were the counterpart of the Hitler Youth. The same
type of camps and athletic programs was provided and the youth
were similarly indoctrinated with National Socialistic doctrines.
The Bund had its "Ordnungs Dienst" or Order Division, counter-
part of Hitler's Storm Troops, both wearing substantially the
same uniforms.
The Bund used the Nazi salute and the swastika symbol.- Their
songs were the official Nazi anthems. Holidays celebrated were
January 30-the date of Hitler's accession to the German Chan-
cellory, April '20-Hitler's birthday, November 9-anniversary of
the Munich Putsch. American holidays were generally unnoticed.
The Bund used the slogan "Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuehrer,"
meaning one German people or race, one Reich, and one leader,
thus characterizing the Nazi philosophy that all persons of German
blood throughout the world are a part of the "superior" German
race, are a part of the German Reich, and are under the leadership
of one Fuehrer-Hitler.
92With regard to the Nazi salute, "Heil Hitler," Nazi swastika,
emblems, etc., used by' the Bund, Judge Goodman in United States v.
Holtz et al, (N.D. Calif. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 63, said: "It cannot be disputed
that this salute and salutation implied allegiance to Hitler, the Fuhrer ...
It is crystal clear that the emblems, slogans, salutes and flags, so used,
typified and symbolized the pledge of allegiance on the part of the Bund
members to the leadership, or Fuhrer, principle."
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The Bund was not only the counterpart of the National Social-
ist party in the United States, but was officially recognized by Ger-
many as taking the place of the Nazi party in this country. The
policies of the Bund from the beginning were dictated from
Germany. Bund leaders were in frequent contact with repre-
sentatives of the Nazi party and later of the Hitler government.
The change in name from "Friends of the Hitler Movement" to the
"Friends of the New Germany" was dictated by the Nazi party,
and the final change of name to the "German-American Bund" in
1936 was made in the presence of a German official sent here to
supervise it.
The principles and doctrines of the German American Bund
were those of National Socialism and Mein Kampf. 3 They have
been variously expressed but probably no more succinctly and
forcefully than in United States V. Sautter et al :9 "The aims and
purposes of the German-American Bund were (a) to act as an arm
of the Nazi Party and of the government of Germany in the distri-
bution of Nazi propaganda in the United States; (b) to promote
race hatred and class discrimination along Nazi lines in the United
States; (c) to band people of German extraction in the United
States together and under the 'yolk' or 'blood' theory to teach
them that they owe primary allegiance to Germany regardless of
their actual citizenship; ° 5 (d) to establish the supremacy of the
German 'volk' as a super-race destined to rule the world; (e) to
promulgate, foster and teach the principles, philosophy, rituals, in-
signia, procedures, songs, slogans and government of the Nazi
Party of Germany in the United States; and (f) to form and have
ready the nucleus of a German National Socialist Government in
!:For an authoritative treatise on the tenets of National Socialism, its
citizenship laws, and its attitude toward naturalization in other countries,
etc., see "NATIONAL SOCIALISM, Basic Principles, Their Application
By The Nazi Party's Foreign Organization, and The Use of Germans
Abroad for Nazi Aims," Department of State, Publication No. 1864, Dec.
1, 1942.
.14(N.D. Ill. 1943) 54 F. Supp. 22.
"'
5In 1940 there was published in the Bund newspaper an article entitled
"Das Blut ist Heilig" (Blood is Sacred) by G. Wilhelm Kunze, subse-
quently national leader of the Bund. The article was later distributed in
pamphlet form in large numbers throughout the Bund. It is a very expressive
statement of the Bund's advocacy of National Socialist doctrines and its
disparagement of American citizenship. It enunciates clearly the basic Nazi
doctrine that German blood is superior to citizenship in a foreign national.
It maintains that there are no persons who are racially Americans but
only persons racially German, Italian, etc., that America is predominantly
German in a racial sense and that those of German extraction have the
duty of preserving their racial integrity.
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the United States in the event an opportunity to establish such a
government should ever present itself."
The foregoing summary of the evidence relative to the German-
American Bund was found to be true by the numerous courts where
it was introduced.9 6 Similarly, no court to our knowledge which
has considered the facts has doubted that National Socialism, as
enunciated by Hitler and as embraced by the German-American
Bund, is the antithesis of constitutional democracy and that no one
can validly take the oath required of naturalized citizens and at
the same time believe in the principles and practices of National
Socialism. The two are repugnant, inconsistent and incompatible."7
CONCLUSION
The most basic and important requirements for citizenship
are loyalty and allegiance to the United States and sincere belief
in our free, democratic form of government. The courts have in-
sisted that applicants strictly comply with the letter of the pro-
cedural requirements for citizenship, such as the prescribed resi-
dence and witnesses. However, the courts had considerable difficulty
in strictly enforcing the requirements of allegiance and attachment
to constitutional principles. This has been due in a large part to
the intangible nature of allegiance and belief in democratic doctrines
and their close relationship to freedom of thought and expression.
96United States v. Wurzenberger, (D. Conn. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 381;
United States v. Holtz et al, (N.D. Calif. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 63; United
States v. Wolter, (W.D. Pa. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 417; United States v.
Baecker et al, (E.D. Mich. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 403; United States v. Scheurer,
(D. Ore. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 243; United States V. Bante, (S.D. N.Y. 1943)
54 F. Supp. 728; United States v. Vogl, (N.D. I1. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 24;
United States v. Haas et al, (N.D. N.Y. 1943) 57 F. Supp. 910; United
States v. Schuchhardt, (N.D. Ind. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 567; United States
v. Kuhn et al, (S.D. N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 407; United States v. Bregler,
(E.D. N.Y. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 837; United States v. Claassen (N.D. Ind.
1944) 56 F. Supp. 71; United States v. Milmovski, N.D. Ind. 1944) 56 F.
Supp. 63; United States v. Knauer, (C.C.A. 7th Cir., May 1945).9 7United States v. Schlotfeldt, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 935;
United States v. Wezel, (S.D. Ill. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 16, 19; United States
v. Ritzen, (D.C. Tex. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 301; United States v. Ebell, (W.D.
Tex. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 43. As stated in United States v. Holtz et al, 54 F.
Supp. 63, 71: " . . . Allegiance to the Fuehrer, (Hitler), blood supremacy,
liquidation of Jews and Negroes were not ideals, but programs-viciously
at variance with the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
" After describing the doctrines of National Socialism as embraced
by the Bund, the Court in United States v. Scheurer, 55 F. Supp. 43, con-
cluded: " . . . The mind which could harbor the principles above outlined,
which were so subversive of freedom of thought, could not at the same
time be loyal to the fundamental principles of this government .... If no
remedy exists for such illegal acquisition of citizenship, a weak spot has
been discovered in our system.. ."
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At the present time the statutes and the facilities available make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, in many cases to ascertain
in advance of naturalization whether the prospective citizen does in
fact meet these requirements. Under the judicial decisions, can-
cellation of citizenship once granted, requires such overwhelming
proof-virtually the proving of a criminal case-that denaturaliza-
tion for lack of allegiance or lack of attachment to constitutional
principles is possible in relatively few instances.
The result is that at the present time it is altogether possible
that persons lacking allegiance to the United States and who have
no attachment or affection for our democratic institutions, in fact
persons serving as advocates of foreign ideologies in the United
States, may be successful both in obtaining and retaining American
citizenship.
